Faizeh Ghasemi, PhD in International Relations

International Relations Think Tank: Kabul was captured by the Taliban much earlier than the world imagined and control of the country was completely taken from the former government. Ghani – with or without hidden clashes with the Taliban – fled the country anyway, the army surrendered, life in Afghanistan became a nightmare for civil activists, especially women, and government offices and government activities in the country were semi-suspended. Despite all these developments, it is simplistic to consider this as the end of several decades of conflict in Afghanistan. Most likely, the country will not go under the banner of a united government of the Taliban. Afghanistan may still enter a new era of insecurity, endless protests and resistance, and even civil war.

First, the differences and divisions among the Taliban leaders were clear long before their arrival in Kabul and other major cities of Afghanistan. The leaders of “Doha” and those who are negotiators have serious conflicts with the leaders of “Kandahari” and Field, not only over negotiations with the West, but also in terms of behavior and ideology. These should be seen along with the many conflicts between the level of leaders and regular Taliban forces. The Taliban leaders have now become more worldly, while the Taliban fighters in the field often have a vague idea of the world of politics and barely know their Afghan society. Many of them had never seen the cities of Afghanistan in their lifetime, and their life in the mountains, far from society, has caused violence in their character and views towards “others” and especially “women”, which results in the type of initial encounters of many of them. They saw in the villages and small towns of Afghanistan. On the other hand, while the Taliban body still has the same level of simple life that its leaders are used to in expensive and luxury hotels in Qatar.

The second important issue is that life in Afghanistan is not the same as before. The people of Afghanistan in 2021, who have tried the Internet and various media, are no longer the people of the nineties. The resistance has already started. From the very first days, women have come to the streets and demanded their rights, the pictures of the girls who were forcibly married by the Taliban to their forces have been published all over the world with the cameras of mobile phones. The Taliban does not have the comprehensive control over Kabul in the 1990s or even the mentality of Kabul. When these images were not leaked from the cities and villages of Afghanistan, nor did the people know enough about the Taliban to think that the Taliban had invaded the country from Pakistan’s religious schools to create security and stability. Today, both the media and the past experience make the Taliban better known to the people of Afghanistan.

Another point is that next to these resistances, beyond in the valleys of Panjshir, Ahmad Massoud’s stand seems like a dream. Where the leaders of the Mujahideen, with those records and those big claims, resisted for two or three days at best and then fled to neighboring countries or reconciled with the Taliban, at least so far Masoud talks about resistance in Panjshir valleys. Of course, Massoud is not alone and has become more of a symbol of the resistance of groups opposing the Taliban. He repeats the same in his interviews. that with or without his victory, the resistance will continue. But beyond this symbolic aspect, Panjshir has a high strategic value. Not only because of the valleys and difficult geography, but because of the young leadership that Siaveshwar has avoided political conflicts, he is the son of one of the most important opponents of the Taliban and has expertise in the field of war and international relations from several international universities.

That’s why Panjshir, a front that has been strengthening its logistics capacity for about two years, will probably be another pole of developments in the coming months, along with Kabul and Islamabad, which has now become the focus of negotiations between various Afghan leaders. Right now, various anti-Taliban groups are coordinating their messages and forces with Panjshir, and the commander of Panjshir has given a lot of hope to the Taliban opponents.

It is not yet clear what Ahmad Massoud will do in the future. Are his words pre-war chants or the voice of someone who wants to get more concessions before negotiations? The only thing that is clear is that foreign countries have not yet publicly supported Massoud. Not America, which left the region too soon and in vain, not other world powers, not even the countries of the region. It seems that all foreign actors have accepted the reality of the Taliban.

At first glance, it seemed that India should have been the first country to support any kind of resistance against the Taliban. But India’s positions have softened against the Taliban. Since last summer, India has started negotiations with some Taliban leaders who have not had much relations with Pakistan, and it seems that instead of its previous policy of confronting the Taliban, it is now seeking to influence the Taliban.

Iran had also started its negotiations with the Taliban before the sudden advances of that group. Tehran cautiously monitors the events in Afghanistan. This time, unlike in the nineties, the Taliban have made promises to protect Iran’s interests in Afghanistan. Of course, these promises do not have much implementation guarantee. After capturing some cities and villages, the Taliban have started persecuting Shiites and Hazaras. Despite the denial of the Taliban leaders, discrimination and hostility against the Hazaras and other ethnic groups in Afghanistan is already being reported. But discrimination against Shiites and Persian speakers is not the only point that can be found to start a discussion about the future of Afghanistan under the umbrella of the Taliban and Iran’s interests.

In fact, the starting points are much more than these. The Taliban is looking for an ethnic, linguistic and religious reconstruction of Afghanistan. The presence of this group marginalizes Iran’s natural allies in Afghanistan, namely Persian speakers and Shiites. No matter how much Iran appeases the Taliban and tries to accept the presence and existence of this group, it will never be able to replace the regional and natural allies of the Taliban, namely Qatar, Pakistan, followed by Turkey and even to some extent Russia and China. Iran’s problem with the Taliban is an ideological and identity problem. Not only in Afghanistan itself, where the dominance of the Taliban ideology is a rival for Iran; Rather, the growth of Taliban ideology in the entire region is contrary to Iran’s long-term interests. After the establishment of the Taliban in Afghanistan, this ideology can become a model of governance among other Takfiri groups, increase the morale of the extremists, and be an operational supporter for other Takfiris in the region. At least twenty Takfiri groups are present in Afghanistan, most of whose forces have cooperated with the Taliban during the attacks of the last two or three weeks. Share-seeking, absorption into the Taliban body, or elimination of these groups after the Taliban dominate the entire country, are three equivalent scenarios that can be imagined for their future; But according to the historical experience of the Taliban, it is likely that the Taliban will look down on their survival, presence and activities. For this reason, it is not unlikely that if the Taliban becomes the dominant power in the country and remains viable in the long term, we will face the growth of Takfiri groups in the entire region. The new conditions will please many groups. From Hayat Tahrir Sham, who made the Taliban his spiritual model, to groups such as Jaish al-Adl in Iran’s borders.

All this should be seen alongside the issue of immigration. Iran, in the neighborhood of Afghanistan, is one of the actors that will be most affected by the events of that country. If Turkey and Europe have been worried about the influx of Afghan immigrants for a long time, they have planned for these days, Iran, with more than nine hundred kilometers of common border, does not have a comprehensive plan for future migrations and how to manage them.

In this way, an insecure Afghanistan makes Iran insecure. Due to the weakening of the forces close to Iran and the inevitable waves of immigration, the spread of Takfiri terrorism in the border areas of Iran, the increase in the security costs of the country and the reduction of the possibility of free and safe trade. If the Taliban remains in power and dominates the whole of Afghanistan, it will weaken Iran’s natural allies and increase the role of Iran’s regional rivals in Afghanistan. If the war and resistance against the Taliban starts from Panjshir or other regions of Afghanistan and continues in an erosive manner, the insecurity in Afghanistan will affect the borders of Iran. In addition to all these buts and ifs, in any scenario in which the Taliban is a powerful side of the story, either as a group that completely dominates the country or as part of an internal conflict, Iran can at best avoid the costs of this. It will reduce the existence and will not benefit from the presence and survival of the Taliban. Ahmad Shah Massoud who once said that I am not a carpenter, but I know the angle of the gate. We have not seen the future, but the crookedness of this road can be seen from here.